The Law of Unintended Consequences: Supreme Court Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Class Certification Rulings by Gant, Scott E.
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 
Volume 6 Issue 2 Article 5 
2004 
The Law of Unintended Consequences: Supreme Court 
Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Class Certification Rulings 
Scott E. Gant 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott E. Gant, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Supreme Court Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Class 
Certification Rulings, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 249 (2004). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol6/iss2/5 
This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of 
Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION OVER
INTERLOCUTORY CLASS CERTIFICATION RULINGS*
Scott E. Gant**
In recent decades the number of class actions filed in
federal court has increased dramatically.' In many such cases, a
ruling on the propriety of class certification effectively
determines the outcome of the litigation. A denial of
certification often means the end of the case because plaintiffs
conclude that pursuing their claims on any basis other than as a
class action fails to make economic sense. On the other hand,
even in a case with relatively weak merits, certification may put
what one court has described as "inordinate or hydraulic
pressure" on defendants to settle in order to avoid the risk of
substantial liability.2 Despite the high stakes often dependent on
* © 2004 Scott E. Gant. All rights reserved.
** B.A., Wesleyan University, 1991; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1995.
1. Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations
and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 401, 408 (2002) ("In the
thirty-five years since the 1966 amendments, class actions have occupied an increasing
share of American courts' attention."); see also Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action
Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 62-68 (Rand Corp. 2000) (noting
"class action litigation has increased dramatically" and observing a "surge in damages class
actions in recent years").
2. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir.
2001); see also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) ("Certification of
a large class may so increase the defendant's potential damages liability and litigation costs
that he may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense.");
In re "Agent Orange" Prod Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Gen.
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir.
1995); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Class certification
[in mass tort cases] magnifies and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims .... In
addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certification creates insurmountable pressure on
defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not. The risk of facing an all-or-
nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 2004)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
certification decisions, such rulings are interlocutory and
therefore not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the principal
statute granting appellate jurisdiction to the courts of appeals.
In recognition of the proliferation of class actions and the
benefits afforded by immediate review of certification rulings in
some cases, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended
in 1998 to allow interlocutory appellate review by courts of
appeals of district court class certification rulings. Specifically, a
new subsection was added to Rule 23, which addresses class
actions in the federal courts.3 Rule 23(f) provides:
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying class
action certification under this rule if application is made to
it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district
judge or the court of appeals so orders.4
is low. These settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.") (citations omitted);
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting "intense
pressure to settle" after certification); Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238
(9th Cir. 1974) ("I doubt that plaintiffs' counsel expect the immense and unmanageable
case that they seek to create to be tried. What they seek to create will become (whether they
intend this result or not) an overwhelmingly costly and potent engine for the compulsion of
settlements, whether just or unjust.") (Duniway, J., concurring); Irwin A. Horowitz &
Kenneth S. Bordens, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on
Jury Decisions, 73 Judicature 22 (1989); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional
Evolutionist Perspective, 80 Comell L. Rev. 941, 958 (1995).
3. See generally Kenneth S. Gould, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23W0:
Interlocutory Appeals of Class Action Certification Decisions, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process
309 (1999); Aimee G. Mackay, Appealability of Class Certification Orders under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(t: Toward a Principled Approach, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 755
(2002); Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule
239, 41 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1531 (2000).
4. Rule 23(f) was adopted in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which
"authoriz[es] th[e] [Supreme] Court to promulgate rules designating certain kinds of orders
as immediately appealable." Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995). Amendments to
federal rules are adopted by the Supreme Court after approval by the Judicial Conference
of the United States. Congress has a period prescribed by statute to act on any rules
approved by the Supreme Court. If Congress does not enact legislation to reject or modify
any proposed rules approved by the Court, such rules take effect. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-
2077 (2003) (available at http://uscode.house.gov); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (citation omitted) ("Federal Rules take effect after an
extensive deliberative process involving many reviewers: a Rules Advisory Committee,
public commenters, the Judicial Conference, this Court, the Congress.").
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Both the Rule itself and the Advisory Committee Notes
accompanying it suggest that courts of appeals have "unfettered
discretion ' 5 to decide whether to entertain review of a district
court class certification ruling.6 Although almost all circuits
have set forth standards under which they will review a class
certification ruling under Rule 23(f),7 review has been granted in
relatively few cases.
8
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) comm. N.
6. As a formal matter, a party files an application in the form of a "petition for
permission to appeal" the class certification ruling below on an interlocutory basis. Rule
23(f) provides that the application be filed within ten days after entry of the class
certification order. See Fed. R. App. P. 5; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). While this short deadline
might have been reasonable were parties to submit terse petitions merely requesting
review, in practice such petitions are typically lengthy, addressing the substance of the
class ruling below. Ordinarily, if the request for review is granted, the court will issue a
briefing schedule similar to that of other appeals.
7. See Waste Mgt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000)
(authorizing appeals under 23(f) when: (1) "a denial of class status effectively ends the
case"; (2) "the grant of class status raises the stakes of the litigation so substantially that the
defendant likely will feel irresistible pressure to settle"; (3) an appeal will permit the
resolution of an unsettled legal issue, and (4) "district court's ruling on class certification is
questionable"); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134,
139 (2d Cir. 2001) ("petitioners seeking leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f) must
demonstrate.., that the certification order will effectively terminate the litigation and there
has been a substantial showing that the district court's decision is questionable, or ... that
the certification order implicates a legal question about which there is a compelling need
for immediate resolution"); Newton, 259 F.3d at 164 (court will exercise discretion under
23(f) when: (1) "denial of certification effectively terminates the litigation because the
value of each plaintiff's claim is outweighed by the costs of stand-alone litigation; (2)...
class certification places inordinate or hydraulic pressure on defendants to settle, avoiding
the risk, however small, of potentially ruinous liability; and (3)... an appeal implicates
novel or unsettled questions of law"); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 144 (4th
Cir. 2001) (considering five factors for exercising 23(f) discretion: "(1) whether the
certification ruling is likely dispositive of the litigation; (2) whether the district court's
certification decision contains a substantial weakness; (3) whether the appeal will permit
the resolution of an unsettled legal question of general importance; (4) the nature and status
of the litigation before the district court"; and "(5) the likelihood that future events will
make appellate review more or less appropriate") (citation omitted); Bertulli v. Indep. Assn.
of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying general abuse of discretion
standard); In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 959 (6th Cir. 2002) ("eschew[ing] any hard-
and-fast test in favor of a broad discretion to evaluate relevant factors that weigh in favor
of or against an interlocutory appeal"), cert. denied sub nom. Northwest Airlines Corp. v.
Chase, 539 U.S. 904 (2003); Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834-35 (7th
Cir. 1999) (authorizing appeals in "death knell" cases where class certification effectively
terminates the litigation either because denial of certification makes the pursuit of
individual claims prohibitively expensive or because grant of certification forces the
defendants to settle, and where certification contributes to development of the law); Glover
v. Stand Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2002) (abuse of discretion); Staton v. Boeing
Co., 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2003) (abuse of discretion); Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado
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Ordinarily, the only recourse for a litigant dissatisfied with
a ruling or action by a court of appeals is to seek review from
the Supreme Court. While there is no guarantee that the Court
will agree to hear a case-in fact the odds are decidedly against
it 9-many litigants avail themselves of the right to request
review. But does even the remote prospect of Supreme Court
review exist when a party has been unsuccessful in persuading a
court of appeals to grant its request for interlocutory review of a
district court class certification ruling? More specifically, does
the Court have jurisdiction under its certiorari authority to
review either the court of appeals's denial of a Rule 23(f)
petition, or the underlying substantive issues related to class
certification? To date the Court itself has not answered this
v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274-76 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (considering: (1) "whether the district
court's ruling is likely dispositive of litigation by creating 'death knell' for either plaintiff
or defendant"; (2) "whether the petitioner has shown substantial weakness in class
certification decision, such that decision likely constitutes abuse of discretion"; (3)
"whether the appeal will permit resolution of unsettled legal issue that is important to
particular litigation as well as important in itself'; (4) "nature and status of litigation before
the district court"; and (5) "likelihood that future events may make immediate appellate
review more or less appropriate"); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289
F.3d 98, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f) typically is
appropriate when: (1) "there is a death-knell situation for ... plaintiff or defendant that is
independent of the merits of the underlying claims, coupled with a class certification
decision by the district court that is questionable, taking into account the district court's
discretion over class certification; (2) ... the certification decision presents an unsettled
and fundamental issue of law relating to class actions, important both to the specific
litigation and generally, that is likely to evade end-of-the-case review; and (3) ... the
district court's class certification decision is manifestly erroneous"); see also Christopher
Village, L.P. v. U.S., 25 Fed. Appx. 922 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (finding Rule 23(f)
inapplicable to certification of class actions in Court of Federal Claims, and ruling that a
party may not seek interlocutory review of the denial of class certification under the rules
of the Court of Federal Claims); Stone Container Corp. v. U. S., 229 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (noting that the rules of the Court of International Trade do not allow for an
interlocutory appeal of the denial of class certification, in contrast to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f)).
8. See e.g. Daniels v. City of N.Y., 13 Fed. Appx. 20 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished);
Lienhart, 255 F.3d 138; Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443 (6th Cir.
2002); Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003); Heimmermann v. First Union
Mortg. Corp., 305 F.3d 1257 (11 th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2641 (2003); Franze
v. Eq. Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2002).
9. During the 2002 Supreme Court term, 1,869 paid cases (i.e., excluding informa
pauperis) were filed. Of those, eighty-four cases were argued. During the 2001 term, 1,886
paid cases were filed, with eighty-eight of those argued. See Supreme Court of the United
States Chief Justice's 2003 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-endreport.html (Jan. 1, 2004) (accessed
July 22, 2004; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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question,' ° and its prior decisions provide surprisingly little
guidance about how the Court would rule were it to decide the
issue. I
A. SUPREME COURT CERTIORARI JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has "original jurisdiction" over certain
types of cases specified in Article III of the Constitution, 2 but
the scope of its jurisdiction is otherwise determined by
Congress.' 3 For about a century, beginning with the Judiciary
Act of 1789, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was entirely
mandatory, and its review confined to cases in which the parties
had a right to appeal. That changed with the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act of 1891, which created the intermediate federal
appellate system and granted the Supreme Court discretion to
review certain types of cases decided by the circuit courts of
appeals. That movement toward greater discretion for the Court
in shaping its own docket continued with the Judiciary Act of
1925, after which, for the first time, the Court's cases reviewed
by writ of certiorari outnumbered those reviewed on the basis of
a mandatory appeal. Congress further revised the statutes
governing the Court's jurisdiction in 1988,14 so that "[w]ith but
10. The author participated in the preparation of a petition for a writ of certiorari that
asked the Court to address the jurisdictional issue discussed here (as well as aspects of a
district court's class certification order), which was denied by the Court. See Northwest
Airlines Corp. v. Chase, 539 U.S. 904 (2003).
11. The Court itself would decide whether it has jurisdiction over class certification
orders where the court of appeals has denied a request for review. While it might seem odd
that the Court should decide the scope of its own authority, the federal courts are often
confronted with general questions about their own jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court's
landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), required the Court to decide
precisely such an issue. There is clearly no constitutional impediment to the Court deciding
whether it has jurisdiction over this or similar questions.
12. See U.S. Const. art. 11I, § 2; see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction
§ 10.3.1, 624 (3d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 1999); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 3.5, 267 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2000).
13. See U.S. v. United Mine Workers ofAm., 330 U.S. 258, 363 (1947).
14. See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to
Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81 (1988) (providing an overview of Supreme Court
jurisdiction).
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the most minor of exceptions, the only path to Supreme Court
review... [is] by petitioning for a writ of certiorari.',' 5
As a result, today the source of jurisdiction for the vast
majority of Supreme Court cases is 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1),16
which provides that the Court may review by grant of a writ of
certiorari "[c]ases in the [federal] courts of appeals."' 7 With
most appeals taken to the circuit courts as a matter of right, such
as appeals of final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, there is little
doubt that once a notice of appeal is filed and the matter
docketed, the case then resides "in" the courts of appeals. What
distinguishes 23(f) petitions from virtually all other appellate
proceedings is that the courts of appeals have "unfettered
discretion"' 8 to decide whether to grant review. The Supreme
15. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance
and Procedure vol. 1, § 2.4 (3d ed., West 1988); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 Colum. L.
Rev. 1643 (2000) (tracing the history of the Court's certiorari jurisdiction).
16. In addition to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), the Court has broad power to grant review
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. The Act has been used by the Court on occasion
as a jurisdictional basis to review district court rulings that a court of appeals declined to
review. See e.g. In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp, 299 U.S. 24, 26 (1936) (analysis under
28 U.S.C. § 377, precursor to § 1651). The Act, however, is rarely invoked by the Court,
and is unlikely to be employed as a basis to review a class certification ruling. See S. Ct. R.
20(1) (discretion to exercise writ "sparingly exercised" in only "exceptional
circumstances"). The writ of certiorari under Section 1651(a) is generally described as the
"common law" writ. See Robert L. Stem et al., Supreme Court Practice 580 (8th ed., BNA
2002); see also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction vol. 16B, § 4005 (2d. ed., West 1996) (discussing
extraordinary writ jurisdiction).
17. Separate provisions govern direct appeals from decisions of three-judge courts,
from state courts, from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and from the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-59 (available at http://uscode.house.
gov).
18. The language of Rule 23(f) prescribes no criteria to be used in the exercise of the
appellate court's discretion when deciding whether to grant or deny review. Presumably,
however, there are limits on the exercise of that discretion. For instance, it seemingly
would be impermissible for a decision to be grounded on a constitutionally impermissible
basis. The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 23(f) do observe that the court
of appeals has "unfettered discretion whether to permit an appeal," but the Court is not
bound by interpretations of Rules or statutes reflected in the Advisory Committee Notes.
See e.g. Hohn v. U.S., 524 U.S. 236, 245 (1998) ("We must reject the suggestion contained
in the Advisory Committee's Notes on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) that '28
U.S.C. § 2253 does not authorize the court of appeals as a court to grant a certificate of
probable cause."'); see also Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1152 (2002) (noting the
Court "consistently refuses to accord the [Advisory Committee] Notes binding authority").
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Court would have certiorari jurisdiction over a class certification
ruling that the court of appeals declined to review under Rule
23(f) only if the "case" is "in the court of appeals."' 9 But can a
"case" be "in" a court of appeals either despite, or by virtue of, a
request and denial for review under Rule 23(f), as those terms
are used in Section 1254(1)?
1. The Origins of28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
Section 1254(1) traces its roots to the 1911 version of a
predecessor statute known as Section 240 of the Judicial Code,
which provided:
In any case, civil or criminal, in which the judgment or
decree of the circuit court of appeals is made final by the
provisions of this Title, it shall be competent for the
Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, upon
the petition of any party thereto, any such case to be
certified to the Supreme Court for its review and
determination, with the same power and authority in the
case as if it had been carried by appeal or writ of error to
the Supreme Court.
20
Under this provision, the Supreme Court's certiorari power was
confined to those cases in which the judgment or decree of the
circuit court of appeals was not reviewable by appeal or writ of
error.
That changed in 1925, when Congress enlarged the Court's
certiorari jurisdiction and reduced mandatory appeals. 2' That
version of the statute provided:
In any case, civil or criminal, in a circuit court of
appeals.., it shall be competent for the Supreme Court of
the United States, upon the petition of any party thereto...
to require by certiorari, either before or after a judgment or
decree by such lower court, that the cause be certified to the
19. See Wright et al., supra n. 16, at § 4036, 14 (observing that "[p]eculiar difficulties
have been encountered in establishing review of cases that arguably are not 'in' the court of
appeals because of failure to secure a required permission for appeal").
20. 28 U.S.C. § 347 (1940) (emphasis added).
21. See Pub. L. No. 415, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936, 936 (1925) (amending § 240 of the
Judicial Code of 1911 to allow certiorari upon petition of either party and amending § 238
of the Judicial Code of 1911 to restrict direct review by the Supreme Court of district court
judgments).
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Supreme Court for determination by it with the same power
and authority, and with like effect, as if the cause had been
brought there by unrestricted writ of error or appeal. 22
Notably, with this revision of the statute, granting the Court
certiorari authority over non-final judgments or decrees of courts
of appeals, Congress first imposed the requirement that a "case"
be "in" a court of appeals as a predicate for certiorari
jurisdiction.
The 1925 version of the statute remained in effect until the
current version of Section 1254(1) was adopted in 1948, as part
of a sweeping revision of Title 28 of the United States Code,
which contains the principal provisions concerning the federal
judiciary.
2. Decisions Bearing on Section 1254(1) 's Operative Language
Even though the relevant language from Section 1254(1)
traces its origins back to the early 1900s, there has been
remarkably little discussion of that language in the Court's
opinions. The first extended discussion came in Mayo v.
House.23 There, the Court considered a petition for certiorari
where the district court denied both a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and a request for a certificate of probable cause,
and the court of appeals denied an application for an appeal in
forma pauperis. Analyzing the predecessor to Section 1254(1)
then in effect, the Court concluded it was not authorized to issue
a writ of certiorari because "the case was never 'in' the court of
appeals, for want of a certificate of probable cause., 24
Nevertheless, the Court granted certiorari under the version of
the All Writs Act operative at the time,25 reversed the order of
the court of appeals and the judgment of the district court, and
remanded to the district court.26
22. Id. (emphasis added); see Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 30 (1934) ("sole essential of
this Court's jurisdiction to review is that there be a case pending in the circuit court of
appeals").
23. 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
24. Id. at 44.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 377 (West 1940).
26. A precursor to Mayo was Ferguson v. Dist. of Columbia, 270 U.S. 633, 633-34
(1926) (per curiam), in which the Court denied a certiorari petition for "want of
jurisdiction" after the court below refused to allow a writ of error. Ferguson was cited four
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Although, as a formal matter, this holding remained
undisturbed for decades, on many occasions after Mayo the
Court issued rulings seemingly inconsistent with Mayo's
holding about the scope of the Court's certiorari jurisdiction. For
instance, several times the Court granted certiorari following
denial of a certificate of probable cause by a court of appeals.
Those decisions did not address the apparent tension with Mayo
and were rendered by the Court with little fanfare-at least until
1981, when the Court directed renewed attention to this issue.
First, in Jeffries v. Barksdale,28 then-Justice Rehnquist,
along with then-Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell,
dissented from the denial of certiorari in a habeas case in which
the court of appeals had turned down the application for a
certificate of probable cause. Relying on the "plain words" of
Section 1254(1), the three reasoned that "[s]ince there was no
certificate of probable cause issued in this case, it was never 'in'
the Court of Appeals .... Since the case was never in the Court
of Appeals we cannot review it by writ of certiorari to that
court."29 Given the absence of authority for the Court to grant a
writ of certiorari, they concluded that the petition for certiorari
should have been dismissed rather than denied.
Less than four months later the issue resurfaced in Davis v.
Jacobs,30 a decision relating to seventeen petitions for certiorari.
This time Justice Stevens joined the three Justices dissenting in
Jeffries in concluding that because the petitioners had not
obtained certificates of appealability, "none of these cases was
properly 'in' the Court of Appeals" and that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to grant the petition for certiorari.3 1 Justice Stevens
nonetheless disagreed with the suggestion that the Court adopt
decades later by the Court as holding that Section 1254(1) "did not permit review by writ
of certiorari of cases where the Court of Appeals ... refused to allow an appeal." Hicks v.
Dist. of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 253 n. 1 (1965). There, the Court instead predicated
jurisdiction "on its power" to issue a common-law writ of certiorari. Id. (citing Mayo).
27. See e.g. Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978) (per curiam) (granting certiorari
after district court rejected petition for habeas corpus and court of appeals denied request
for certificate of probable cause); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (granting
certiorari after district court dismissed petition for habeas corpus and court of appeals
denied request for certificate of probable cause).
28. 453 U.S. 914 (1981).
29. Id. at 915-16.
30. 454 U.S. 911 (1981).
31. Id. at 912.
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the practice of dismissing petitions rather than denying them in
such circumstances, on the grounds that determining in every
case whether the form of an order should be a denial or
dismissal was "not a trivial matter" and was an unwarranted
32change in the Court's practice.
Despite this flurry of attention, after 1981 the Court did not
return to this distinction between dismissals and denials of
certiorari petitions suggested by Section 1254(1). Instead, it
continued its practice of granting certiorari in some cases even
where a certificate of probable cause had been denied-
notwithstanding that Mayo formally remained "good law., 3 3
During roughly the same period as these habeas cases were
being considered, the Court also decided two cases involving
President Nixon in which it addressed (albeit briefly) the critical
language from Section 1254(1). In United States v. Nixon,34 the
Court was presented with a petition for certiorari by then-sitting
President Nixon. In connection with the prosecution of criminal
charges against certain individuals related to Watergate, a third-
party subpoena had been issued directing the President to
produce tape recordings and documents related to his
conversations with aides and advisors. The district court denied
the President's motion to quash the subpoena. The President
appealed to the court of appeals, but both the government and
the President requested certiorari even before judgment by the
court of appeals. After explaining that "[t]he threshold question"
was whether the case was "properly 'in' the Court of Appeals
when the petition for certiorari was filed in this Court," the
Court observed (without discussion) that "the appeal was timely
filed and all other procedural requirements met, and [the case
was] ... properly 'in' the Court of Appeals. 35
32. Id. at 914-15.
33. See e.g. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (granting certiorari after district court
and court of appeals denied requests for certificate of probable cause); Allen v. Hardy, 478
U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam) (granting certiorari after district court and court of appeals
denied requests for certificate of probable cause). In these cases the Court did not expressly
address the basis for its jurisdiction, although petitioners had invoked the Court's authority
under Section 1254(1), and it would be exceedingly unusual for the Court to base its
jurisdiction on the All Writs Act without saying so, particularly when petitioners invoked
the Court's certiorari authority.
34. 418 U.S. 683, 690-92 (1974).
35. Id. at 692.
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In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,36 a former government employee
filed a civil suit against then-former President Nixon seeking
damages based on actions taken by the President while in office.
Nixon's claim of absolute immunity was rejected by the district
court, and the court of appeals summarily dismissed his appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address the scope of presidential immunity. Before proceeding
to the substance of that issue, however, the Court rejected
Respondent's argument that the district court's order was not a
"case" properly "in" the court of appeals, and therefore was not
subject to review under Section 1254(1). Having determined that
the case fell within the small class of interlocutory orders
immediately appealable under the "collateral order" doctrine,
37
the Court found that the court of appeals erred in concluding it
lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's appeal. It therefore
followed, the Court explained, "that the case was 'in' the Court
of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within [its] certiorari
jurisdiction. ' 3 8
By far the most extensive discussion of the critical
language from Section 1254(1) appeared relatively recently, in
Hohn v. United States.39 Hohn had been convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) for "use" of a firearm during the commission of
a drug offense. Two years after his conviction, in an unrelated
case, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 924(c) in a way that
made clear Hohn had been convicted by a jury given improper
instructions about the meaning of the statute. Hohn filed a
motion to vacate his conviction on the ground the evidence at
trial was insufficient to convict him under a proper construction
of Section 924(c). The district court denied Hohn's motion, and
also denied his request for a certificate of appealability, which
was required under a new federal law to appeal the denial of a
petition for habeas corpus.40 Under the new law, the court of
36. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
37. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see also Wright et
al., supra n. 16, at vol. 16, § 3911 (discussing "collateral order" doctrine).
38. 457 U.S. at 743.
39. 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
40. The certificates of appealability required under the new law were functional
equivalents of what had been known as certificates of probable cause. See generally Limin
Zheng, Actual Innocence as a Gateway through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the
Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 2101 (2002).
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appeals could also issue a certificate of appealability, but
declined to do so by a two-to-one panel vote.41
Hohn then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court.42 The Court granted certiorari to decide whether
it has jurisdiction to review decisions of courts of appeals
denying applications for certificates of appealability.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. The majority
first explained that Hohn's application for a certificate of
appealability constituted a "case," as the term is used in Section
1254(1). Among the factors cited by Justice Kennedy were that
the matter was entered on the docket of the court of appeals,
submitted to a panel, and decided in a published opinion, which
included a dissent; that the court of appeals entered judgment,
issued a mandate and entertained a petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc; and that the court of appeals
acknowledged its decision made circuit law (i.e., the decision
was precedential). The majority also "drew guidance" from the
fact that all but one court of appeals had adopted rules to govern
the disposition of certificate applications, observing that "[t]hese
directives would be meaningless if applications for certificates
of appealability were not matters subject to the control and
disposition of the courts of appeals. 43
The majority further concluded that Hohn's "case" was "in
the court of appeals," as the phrase is used in Section 1254(1),
41. Hahn v. U.S., 99 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
42. In response to Hohn's certiorari petition the Solicitor General of the United States
effectively sided with Hohn and suggested that the Court vacate the decision of the Court
of Appeals and remand for further consideration of whether a certificate of appealability
should issue. On the jurisdictional issue, the Solicitor General's brief remarked that "[t]he
Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 1254(1) to review the merits of an underlying
[federal habeas] motion until a certificate of appealability has issued." See Br. of the U.S.
at 8, Hohn v. U.S., 524 U.S. 236 (1998) (citing Mayo as adverse precedent) (available at
1997 WL 799988). The Solicitor General's brief further suggested that the Court "arguably
has jurisdiction under Section 1254(1)... to review the denial by a court of appeals of an
application for a certificate of appealability ... [but] jurisdiction [under the statute] appears
to be foreclosed by th[e] Court's precedent." Id Accordingly, the Solicitor General urged
the Court to invoke its common law certiorari authority under the All Writs Act to reverse
and remand for further consideration. Given that petitioner and the government took
substantially similar positions in the case, the Court appointed Jeffrey Sutton (who had
clerked for Chief Justice Rehnquist and is now a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit) as amicus curiae to argue against the Court's jurisdiction.
43. Hohn, 524 U.S. at 243.
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observing that a request to proceed before a court of appeals
should not be "regarded as a threshold inquiry separate from the
merits which, if denied, prevents the case from ever being in the
court of appeals."44 According to the majority, the Court's
precedents
foreclose the proposition that the failure to satisfy a
procedural threshold prerequisite for court of appeals
jurisdiction, such as the issuance of a certificate of
appealability, prevents a case from being in the court of
appeals for purposes of § 1254(1). 4 5
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices O'Connor and Thomas.
The dissent strongly disputed the idea that Section 1254(1)
conferred upon the Court jurisdiction over Hohn's petition for
certiorari. In Justice Scalia's view, the denial of Hohn's request
for a certificate of appealability to review the district court order
foreclosed Supreme Court review: "Because it could not be
taken to the Court of Appeals, it quite obviously was never in
the Court of Appeals; and because it was never in the Court of
Appeals, we lack jurisdiction under § 1254(1) to entertain it.''46
Although Justice Scalia called the majority's view that Hohn's
request was "in" the court of appeals the "most obvious of [the]
Court's statutory distortions," he also rejected the notion that a
request for a certificate of appealability was a "case" within the
meaning of Section 1254(1), describing the majority's view as a
"jaw-dropper" with "serious collateral consequences.'47
According to the dissent, the request for a certificate of
appealability "does not have the requisite qualities of a legal
'case' under any known definition.... It is nothing more than a
request for permission to seek review.
48
44. Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 248.
46. Id. at 254 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 256.
48. Id.; see also id. ("The request for a COA is not some separate 'case' that can subsist
apart from that underlying suit; it is merely a procedural requirement that must be fulfilled"
before petitioner's action "can advance to the appellate court."); id. at 258 ("threshold
procedural requirement that petitioner must meet in order to carry his § 2255 suit to the
appellate stage"); id. at 260 n. 2 ("Not until today has anyone thought that a 'case' could
consist of a disembodied request for appeal."). In support of the idea that no case was
before the court of appeals in Hohn's case, Justice Scalia also noted that "[iut does not
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B. SUPREME COURT CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER CLASS
CERTIFICATION RULINGS FOLLOWING REQUESTS FOR REVIEW
UNDER RULE 23(F)
What do the language of Section 1254(1) and the Court's
precedents suggest about how the Court would rule, and should
rule, were it to decide whether it has jurisdiction to review a
class certification order where the court of appeals has denied
(or failed to act upon) a Rule 23(f) petition?49
As a predictive matter, the Justices who comprised the
majority in Hohn appear likely to employ a relatively expansive
interpretation of Section 1254(1). Hohn obviously concerned
different substantive issues than would be presented in any Rule
23(f) petition, and it arose in a procedural context in which the
court of appeals was the end of the line for the petitioner absent
Supreme Court review. However, nothing the majority said in
Hohn suggests that its analysis of the statutory language from
Section 1254(1) depended on the fact that a denial of review
would effectively terminate the petitioner's claims, and there is
no reason to think that it would employ a restrictive
interpretation of Section 1254(1) that it declined to adopt in
Hohn.
On the other hand, the dissenting Justices in Hohn
concluded, without any equivocation, that a request for review is
not a "case" and cannot be "in" the court of appeals, as those
terms are used in Section 1254(1). While their analysis of the
jurisdictional question in Hohn may have reflected their views
on habeas corpus jurisprudence generally, and their reactions to
Congress's effort to limit the availability of habeas petitions in
particular, it appears unlikely they would evaluate Section
1254(1) differently in the context of a denied Rule 23(f)
assert a grievance against anyone, does not seek remedy or redress for any legal injury, and
does not even require a 'party' on the other side." Id. at 256.
49. The closest analogue to Rule 23(f) is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which allows for
interlocutory appellate review when the district court certifies an issue and the court of
appeals agrees to consider the issue. Even though Section 1292(b) has been in effect since
1958, the Court has never addressed its jurisdiction to review an issue certified by a district
court under Section 1292(b) that the court of appeals declined to review-and therefore has
never interpreted Section 1254 in that context.
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petition.5 ° How these Justices would rule were they confronted
with the jurisdictional question addressed here is, therefore,
likely to turn on their perception of Hohn's precedential effect.
The entire Court has already abided by Hohn as applied to
subsequent habeas cases involving certificates of appealability. 5 1
Yet the forceful opposition to an expansive interpretation of
Section 1254(1) expressed by those dissenting in Hohn provides
reason to doubt they will feel compelled by principles of stare
decisis to construe the statute as conferring jurisdiction on the
Court after the denial of a Rule 23(f) petition.52 Thus, if the
50. See Wright et al., supra n. 16, at vol. 17, § 4036, 18 ("The tensions evident in the
Hohn opinions surely arise as much from the common passions that surround federal
habeas corpus review of state convictions as from the more rarified passions generated by
debate whether Supreme Court review should be effected by statutory certiorari or
common-law certiorari.").
51. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (deciding case after denial of
certificate of appealability by court of appeals); see also Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct.
2562 (2004) (six Justices finding that the Fifth Circuit erred in not issuing a certificate of
appealability; three Justices dissenting on grounds that no certificate of appealability was
warranted, but not contesting the Court's jurisdiction). In at least two other AEDPA cases,
the Court has (understandably) described the holding of Hohn in narrow terms. See
Woodford v. Garceau, 123 S. Ct. 1398, 1403 (2003) ("Although we concluded [in Hohn]
that an application for a COA constituted a case within the meaning of Section 1254, we
did not provide an all-purpose definition of the term 'case."'); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 482 (2000) (citing Hohn for the proposition that "[u]nder AEDPA, an appellate case is
commenced when the application for a COA is filed").
52. Some commentators have argued that principles of stare decisis deserve greatest
adherence in the context of statutory interpretation. See e.g. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 281 (1989); Lawrence C. Marshall,
"Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich.
L. Rev. 177 (1989). Justice Scalia argued as much in Hohn, 524 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[S]tare decisis effect is increased by the fact that it was a statutory holding.").
Although this argument was marshaled against an expansive interpretation of Section
1254(1) in Hohn, it could make it more likely the Justices dissenting in Hohn would vest
the Court's decision with a broad precedential effect, since Hohn represents the Court's
current construction of the statute. Justice Scalia also argued that Congress adopted the
Court's ruling in Mayo, contending that "statutes are deemed to adopt the extant holdings"
of the Court. 524 U.S. at 262 (citing Keene Corp. v. U.S., 508 U.S. 200, 212 (1993) ("[W]e
apply the presumption that Congress was aware of these earlier judicial interpretations [or
predecessor statute] and, in effect, adopted them.")). There are two major problems with
such an argument, however. First, as discussed, many decisions rendered by the Court after
Mayo departed from its holding, granting certiorari in situations analogous to that in Hohn.
If it was reasonable for members of Congress to rely on Court precedent in deciding
whether they need address an issue, it was also reasonable to expect those members to be
aware of all of the Court's decisions. Second, the failure to amend the Court's
jurisdictional statute to ensure that the Court did not grant certiorari in a case like that of
Hohn cannot be excused by Congress's expectation that the Court would rule any particular
way if presented with the question. Congressional expectation that the Court will read a
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Court does take up this issue, its decision may well reflect sharp
divisions similar to those apparent in Hohn.
From a normative standpoint, although the question is
principally one of statutory interpretation, nothing about the
words,54 the structure, or the legislative history of Section
1254(1) themselves determine whether the Court has jurisdiction
to review a class certification ruling where a Rule 23(f) petition
has been denied by the court of appeals.55 Instead, the meaning
of the statute is best derived from the Court's precedent and
practices-and these suggest that the Court does have certiorari
jurisdiction to evaluate a district court class certification ruling 56
statute in a particular way does not excuse the legislature from writing the laws to conform
with how it expects the Court to rule.
53. The starting point for statutory interpretation is, of course, the language of the
statute at issue. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
826, 833 (2002) (considering appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and observing "[o]ur task here is not to determine what would further Congress's
goal of ensuring patent-law uniformity, but to determine what the words of the
[jurisdiction-conferring] statute must fairly be understood to mean"); Carter v. U.S., 530
U.S. 255, 271 (2000) ("In analyzing a statute, we begin by examining the text ... not by
'psychoanalyzing those who enacted it."' (citations omitted)); Est. of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case, the beginning
point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue
judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance,
is finished." (citation omitted)).
54. The terms "case" and "in" have no apparent "plain" meaning in the context of
Section 1254(1). Although there is some intuitive appeal to the idea that a matter (be it for
a certificate of appealability or for permission to appeal) cannot have come to be "in" the
court of appeals if permission for review was denied, there is equal intuitive appeal to the
idea that the matter must have been "in" the court for the court of appeals to rule on it.
55. Although the role of legislative history has been the subject of considerable
discussion in recent years by both the Court and commentators, the legislative history of
Section 1254(1) provides no guidance about how it should be interpreted. See generally
Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000
Wis. L. Rev. 205.
56. Once the Court has certiorari jurisdiction under Section 1254(1), that jurisdiction
extends to review the district court's certification ruling; it is not limited to determining
whether the court of appeals erred in denying the request for interlocutory review. The
language of Section 1254(1) sets out no limitations on the scope of the Court's review after
its prerequisites are satisfied-that is, once a "case" is "in" the court of appeals. The
Court's precedents similarly suggest that once a "case" is "in" the appeals court it may
address any aspect of the matter it deems appropriate. See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433
(1997) (granting certiorari and addressing merits after district court and court of appeals
denied requests for certificate of probable cause); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 n.
23 (1982) ("Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to the
Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits."); cf Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
112 (1964) (after the court of appeals refused to grant mandamus to address a discovery
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once a Rule 23(f) petition has been filed with the court of
appeals, regardless of whether that court denies the request or
fails to act on it.
57
As discussed above, the Court's decisions during the more
than half century between Mayo and Hohn collectively represent
the repudiation of a narrow or mechanical construction of
1254(1),58 while Hohn (and the few subsequent decisions
discussing it) support the conclusion that the Court has
jurisdiction notwithstanding the denial of a Rule 23(f) petition.
For example, Hohn and subsequent cases have determined
that an application for a certificate of appealability constitutes a
"case" within the meaning of Section 1254(1). The Hohn
majority described a "case" as a matter "subject to the control
and disposition of the court of appeals., 59 Although it remains to
be seen whether the Justices accept this as ageneral test for what
constitutes a "case" under Section 1254(1),6°it appears clear that
a request for action from a court of appeals specifically
authorized by a statute or rule, including a request for review in
issue on an interlocutory basis, the Court elected to "determine on the merits the issues
presented"); see also Wright et al., supra n. 16, at vol. 17, § 4036, 19 ("Once a case has
come to be in the court of appeals, there is power to issue certiorari without any
limitation.
57. There is little doubt that once a Rule 23(f) petition is granted the "case" is "in" the
court of appeals, and the Court has jurisdiction under Section 1254(l). See U.S. v.
Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700 (1987); see also Wright et al., supra n. 16, at vol.
17, § 4036, 28 n. 50 ("The Court regularly reviews cases decided in courts of appeals on
appeal under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b) without further comment on its own jurisdiction.").
58. The Hohn majority accurately observed that "the rule of procedure announced in
House v. Mayo has often been disregarded" in the Court's own practice. 524 U.S. at 252.
The brief submitted by the Solicitor General's Office in Hohn also observed that "[m]any
of the cases decided since [Mayo] ... raise some doubts about whether the Court has
adhered to the view that it lacks jurisdiction under Section 1254(1) to review [a] denial of a
certificate [of probable cause or appealability]." See Br. of U.S. at 23, Hohn v. U.S., 524
U.S. 236 (1998) (available at 1997 WL 799988). One commentator appears to have
ignored these post-Mayo decisions when describing Hohn as a "striking example of failed
judicial restraint" because the Court overruled Mayo "without a compelling reason" and
failed to abide by principles of stare decisis. See Student Author, Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure: Supreme Court Certiorari Jurisdiction, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 263, 269 (1998).
59. 524 U.S. at 243.
60. See Woodford v. Garceau, 123 S. Ct. 1398, 1403 (2003) ("[W]e concluded [in
Hohn] that an application for a COA constituted a case within the meaning of Section
1254."); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 482 (2000) ("Under AEDPA, an appellate case
is commenced when the application for a COA is filed.").
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accordance with Rule 23(f), can constitute a "case" for purposes
of satisfying Section 1254(1).6
Hohn also supports the conclusion that a request for
permission to appeal under Rule 23(f) is "in" the court of
appeals, as the term is used in Section 1254(1).62 There, the
Court explained that a request to proceed before a court of
appeals should not be "regarded as a threshold inquiry separate
from the merits which, if denied, prevents the case from ever
being in the court of appeals, 63 and that "the failure to satisfy a
threshold prerequisite for court of appeals jurisdiction, such as
the issuance of a certificate of appealability, [does not] prevent[]
a case from being in the court of appeals for purposes of Section
1254(l)." 64 Thus, under Hohn, once a request for review is
made, the matter is "in" the court of Upeals, whether the request
is granted, denied, or not acted upon.
Moreover, the conclusion that a case is "in" the court of
appeals once a Rule 23(f) petition is granted, but not "in" that
court when a petition is denied, would produce strange results.
61. The leading treatise on Supreme Court practice seemingly also reads the Court's
precedents as consistent with an assertion that the Court has jurisdiction after the denial of
a Rule 23(f) petition. See Stem et al., supra n. 16, at 71 ("[T]he Court has given a broad
interpretation to the word 'cases' so as to include not only a full-blown appeal from a
district court decision but also any kind of motion or application made to a court of appeals
that results in an order bearing the imprimatur of the court of appeals or a judge thereof.").
62. See Wright et al., supra n. 16, at vol. 17, § 4036, 10 ("The greatest opportunity for
imposing technicalistic difficulties [on the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction under
Section 1254(1)] is presented by the statutory requirement that the case be 'in' the court of
appeals, but no genuine obstacle has in fact resulted.").
63. 524 U.S. at 246 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 248.
65. The Court's approach in cases involving denials by court of appeals of requests for
mandamus during that period similarly suggests the Court has jurisdiction to review a class
certification ruling after the denial of a Rule 23(f) petition. See e.g. Mallard v. S.D. Iowa,
490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989) (certiorari granted after court of appeals denial of writ of
mandamus without opinion); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). The petitions
for certiorari and merits briefs in Mallard and Schlagenhauf reveal the parties invoked 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1) as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction in those cases. This past term the
Court granted certiorari in a high profile case involving Vice President Cheney. See
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004) (vacating Court of
Appeals's order declining to issue writ of mandamus and remanding for reconsideration of
whether writ should issue). In neither its order granting certiorari nor its decision did the
Court address the basis for its jurisdiction, although Petitioners invoked 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1) in their filings, and Respondents did not challenge Petitioners' reliance on the
statute as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction. See id; Cheney v. US. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of
Columbia, 540 U.S. 1088 (2003) (granting certiorari).
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Compare one situation, in which the court of appeals grants a
petition for review and then issues a substantive opinion
affirming the class certification order below, with another, in
which the court of appeals issues a substantive opinion
analyzing the class certification order below, but instead of
affirming, elects to deny the petition. 66 Under the approach of
the dissenting Justices in Hohn, the Court would have
jurisdiction in the former situation but not the latter. The
approach of the Hohn majority yields a more sensible result,67
where the Court's jurisdiction does not turn on the procedural
description selected by the court of appeals. 68
Although it might seem strange that the addition of a
procedural rule would result in the Court having jurisdiction
over matters previously outside its purview, upon closer
examination this is a foreseeable outcome of the interplay
between Section 1254(1) and the web of statutes and rules
dictating what comes before the courts of appeals. 69 Under
66. See Wright et al., supra n. 16, at vol. 17, § 4036, 18 (The circumstances of Hohn v.
United States clearly illustrate the merits-like review that may enter a decision to deny a
certificate of appealability.).
67. Although Hohn appears to have been decided correctly, not all of the majority's
opinion is compelling. For instance, the majority seemingly attempted to draw support for
its ruling by reasoning that such a ruling would allow the Court to carry out its "normal
function of reviewing possible misapplications of law by the courts of appeals without
having to resort to extraordinary remedies [i.e., the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651]." 524
U.S. at 251. It is unclear how or why the construction of Section 1254(1) does or should
tum on an analysis of the All Writs Act as a possible source of jurisdiction. Arguably such
reasoning could bear on assessing congressional intent, but the majority makes no such
suggestion.
68. The notion that the Court has jurisdiction under Section 1254(1) despite the denial
of a Rule 23(f) petition is consistent with the Court's authority to exercise jurisdiction
before issues have been addressed by a court of appeals. The Court has on many occasions
granted certiorari to review district court orders even before they have been substantively
reviewed by an intermediate appellate court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) (available at
http://uscode.house.gov) ("An application to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to
review a case before judgment has been rendered in the court of appeals may be made at
any time before judgment."); Sup. Ct. R. 11; see also Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361
(1989); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); US. v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (deciding
merits of interlocutory district court order regarding claims of absolute immunity after
court of appeals dismissed appeal for lack of jurisdiction); McElroy v. U.S., 361 U.S. 281
(1960) (certiorari granted before argument in court of appeals but after appeal was
"perfected").
69. Rule 23(f) itself neither enlarged nor contracted the Court's jurisdiction, since a
change in a procedural rule cannot "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (available at http://uscode.house.gov); cf Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,
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Section 1254(1), any statute or rule that brings a matter before a
court of appeals will also bring that matter within the reach of
the Supreme Court. 7° Rule 23(f presents a wrinkle in this
dynamic, in that it specifies that courts of appeals may elect
whether to grant interlocutory review. But a request for review
authorized by a statute or rule should bring that matter within
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court regardless of
how the court of appeals responds to the request.7?
CONCLUSION
Nothing in the paper trail leading to the adoption of Rule
23(f) indicates that those responsible for its enactment (i.e., the
Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court and Congress)
considered the availability (or desirability) of Supreme Court
review after either the grant or denial of a Rule 23(t) petition.
And there is certainly no reason to think that those who
participated in the process intended that its enactment would
result in the Court having jurisdiction to review class
certification decisions on an interlocutory basis when a court of
appeals declines to conduct its own review. Yet that is
seemingly what has occurred: Rule 23(f) has brought within the
jurisdictional reach of the Court the ability to review district
court class certification rulings following a request for appeals
court review in accordance with the Rule.
336 (1969) (amendment to Rule 23 "did not and could not" change "the scope of the
congressionally enacted grant ofjurisdiction to the district courts").
70. Congress is free to repeal or alter Rule 23(f) at any time, and similarly it can amend
Section 1254(1) to foreclose the Court's power to review class certification rulings,
unwittingly made possible with the enactment of Rule 23(f).
71. Even if the Court has jurisdiction to review a class certification order when a court
of appeals has denied review under Rule 23(f), it presumably will only do so when the
class certification order presents issues that are otherwise worthy of a grant of certiorari.
Moreover, the fact that a court of appeals has not evaluated the propriety of the district
court's certification order may be an additional consideration weighing against a grant of
certiorari.
72. Although the federal system generally disfavors interlocutory appeals, Rule 23(f)
was enacted in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which specifically authorizes the
adoption of rules designating certain kinds of orders as immediately appealable. See
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999) ("Congress'[s]
designation of the rulemaking process as the way to define or refine when a district court
ruling is 'final' and when an interlocutory order is appealable warrants the Judiciary's full
respect."). Nothing in the language or history of Section 1292(e) suggests such orders
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Of course, some Supreme Court Justices might reach
different conclusions were they to address the jurisdictional
issues raised by Rule 23(f) petitions discussed here, and it is
likely that any decision by the Court would reflect divisions like
those in Hohn and would be exceedingly close. Nonetheless,
when presented with an appropriate case, the Court should
address these issues. A decision applying Section 1254(1) to
Rule 23(f) petitions would not only offer guidance to class
action plaintiffs and defendants, but would also clarify similarly
unresolved jurisdictional issues related to Section 1292(b), and
to other appeals by permission that might be adopted in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court, provided that they come to be "in" the court of
appeals.

